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4. It renders one of the most important conveniences of modern
life susceptible at any moment of being used as an instrument of
infinite mischiefs in the community. It is not necessary to enumerate these mischiefs. Any one can picture to his own mind what

would be the condition of things in any neighborhood, if its whole
correspondence were exposed to the public gaze. A single instance,
in which the veil of confidential secrecy is thrust aside, will intro-

duce some of these evils, but it will suggest the possibility that
any moment all the others may follow.
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Courts of equity have jurisdiction to relieve against mutual mistakes of the parties in the execution of written contracts, so as to make them conform to the real
intention of the parties.
Such mistakes may be shown by parol evidence, but in all such cases parol evidence is to be received with great caution : and, where the mistake is denied,
should never be made the foundation of a decree variant from the written contract,
except it be of the clearest and most satisfactory character.
It is a general rule, that a mere mistake of law, stripped of all other circumstances, is not a ground for reforming a written contract founded on such mistake.
When, however, the mistake has arisen from a misapprehension of a rule of
law, unaccompanied by any negligence on the part of the party seeking relief, or
any Izches in discovering and alleging the mistake, ant the denial of relief by reforming the contract would enable the other party to obtain an unconscionable
advantage, a court of equity-the mistake being clearly proved-will reform the
instrument. In all such cases, the court will lay hold of any additional circumstances, fully established, which will justify its interposition, and prevent marked
injustice being done.
A policy was issued to a partner in his own name and so expressed as only to
cover his individual interest in the property, but he bad effected the insurance for
his firm and accepted the policy on the assurance of the insurer's agent that the
whole partnership interest was covered by it. Held, that the firm were entitled to
have the policy reformed in equity.
A policy of insurance against loss by fire contained a provision that, "If tha
situation or circumstances affecting the risk thereupon [the property] shall be so
altered or changed, either by changb of occupancy in the premises insured or containing property insured, or from adjacent exposure, whereby the hazard is increased, and the assured fail to notify the company; or if the title to said property
shall be in any way changed * * * in every such case the risk thereupon" shall
cease and determine, and the policy be null and void." The cotton insured was,
at the time the insurance was taken out, guarded by Federal soldiers, and was
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subsequently, but without lawful authority, seized under orders of Federal officials,
who subsequently retained the exclusive control and custody thereof, and guarded
the same till the time of the loss : Held, that such change of control and custody
not increasing the hazard, nor affecting the owner's title to the cotton, he was
under no obligation to inform the company thereof ; and, that his failure to inform
the company did not avoid the policy.

THIS was a suit in equity, instituted by Thomas Snell, Samuel
L. Keith and Abner Taylor, partners under the firm-name of
Snell, Taylor & Co., to reform a certain policy of insurance issued
by the Atlantic Fire and Marine Insurance Company of Providence,
and insuring Samuel L. Keith, from December 6th 1865, at noon,
to January 7th 1866, at noon, against loss or damage by fire, in
the sum of $8000, on 220 bales of cotton, described as "stored in
open shed at West Point, Miss.; loss, if any, payable to Messrs.
Keith, Snell & Taylor."
The material allegations in the bill were as follows: That said
firm, on December 6th 1865, were the owners of 220 bales of cotton, worth more than $50,000, stored at West Point, Miss., awaiting transportation to some northern market; that Keith applied in
behalf of his firm to Holmes & Bro., general insurance agents at
Chicago, representing several companies, including the defendant
in error, to procure insurance upon all the cotton, for the benefit
of the firm, in the sum of $49,500, during such time as it remained
at West Point, which time was uncertain, in view of the difficulties
of transportation; that Holmes & Bro., the duly accredited and
authorized agents, among others, of the defendant company, did
agree with Keith, acting for and in behalf of his firm, to make,
grant and secure insurance in the companies by them represented,
on this cotton, in the sum of $49,500, while it was stored at West
Point, and until shipped to a northern market, and to receive a
premium of one per cent. on the total amount insured, to wit,
$495, which sum Keith agreed to pay Holmes & Bro., provided
the time for the insurance did not exceed one month, but to have a
decreased rate if the time exceeded one month, the agreed rate to
be paid by Keith when the cotton was removed from West Point,
.when the extent of the insurance could be definitely fixed; that on
the 6th December 1865, Holmes & Bro., with intent to carry this
agreement into effect, caused to be made several policies in different
companies, among them the policy sued on, making an aggregate
insurance of $49,500, and, after the loss occurred, notified Keith
to pay, and he did pay, the sm of $495, the premium on the whole
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amount insured, $80 of which was paid to and received by the defendant in error, for and on account of his firm, and in pursuance
of the agreement with Holmes & Bro. ; that the policy sued on
remained in the possession of Holmes & Bro. until some time after
the loss; that after the loss, and before any application to adjust
the same was made, Holmes & Bro., with the intent to carry out
the agreement that the cotton should be insured until its shipment
from West Point, filled up the policy, so that by the terms thereof
the insurance extended from December 6th 1865 until January 7th
1866, at noon; that Keith was assured by Holmes & Bro., when
the insurance was taken, that it was not necessary that the policy
should state in terms that the insurance was for, and on account of,
Snell, Taylor & Co., and that the firm would be as fully protected,
and the loss would be as promptly paid, as if the policy had expressly stated that the insurance was for and on its account; that,
relying upon those assurances, and ignorant that, by the terms and
legal effect of the terms employed, no other interest in the cotton
was insured except his, Keith took the policy into his possession, in
the full belief that it covered the entire interest of the firm; that
soon thereafter, upon being advised to the contrary by his attorney,
he demanded of the insurance agents that the policy be corrected
so as to conform to the real contract and agreement, but Holmes &
Bro. refused to correct or alter the same in any way.
The prayer of the bill was that the company be decreea and
ordered to correct and reform the policy by inserting therein the
stipulation that the insurance was made for the benefit or for the
account of Snell, Taylor & Co., and that the firm have a decree
for the sum so intended to be insured on the cotton.
The insurance company filed an answer, embracing certain
grounds of defence, which sufficiently appear in the opinion.
The bill upon final hearing was dismissed, and from that final
order this appeal is prosecuted.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HARLAN, J.-1. We are satisfied that a valid contract of insurance was entered into, on the 6th December 1865, between Keith,
representing Snell, Taylor & Co., and Holmes & Bro., representing
the defendant and other insurance companies, and we entertain no
serious doubt as to its terms or scope. Although there is some
conflict in the testimony as to what occurred at the time the conVOL. XXVII.-1I
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tract was concluded, it is shown, to our entire satisfaction, not only
that the agreed insurance covered the 220 bales of cotton, but that
Holmes & Bro., with knowledge or information that the cotton was
owned by Snell, Taylor & Co., and not by Keith individually,
intended to insure, and, by direct statements, induced him to believe
that they were giving insurance, in his name, upon the interest of
the firm. He assented to the insurance being so taken in his
name, because of the distinct representation and agreement that
the interest of his firm in the cotton would be thereby fully protected against loss by fire so long as it remained at West Point.
But according to the technical import of the words employed in
the policy, which the company subsequently issued and delivered,
only Keith's interest in the cotton is insured. Such is the construction which the company now insists should be put upon the
policy in the event the court decides there was a binding contract
of insurance. The fundamental inquiry, therefore, is whether
Snell, Taylor & Co. are entitled to have the policy reformed so as
to cover their interest.
We have before us a contract from which, by mistake, material
stipulations have been omitted, whereby the true intent and meaning of the parties are not fully or accurately expressed. There was
a definite, concluded agreement as to insurance, which, in point of
time, preceded the preparation and delivery of the policy, and this
is demonstrated by legal and exact evidence, which removes all
doubt as to the sense and understanding of the parties. In the
attempt to embody the contract in a written agreement there has
been a mutual mistake, caused chiefly by that contracting party
who now seeks to limit the insurance to an interest in the property
less than that agreed to be insured. The written agreement did
not effect that which the parties intended. That a court of equity
can afford relief in such a case is, we think, well settled by the
authorities. In Simpson v. Vaughan, 2 Atk. 33, Lord HLAlDwIcKE said that a mistake was "a head of equity on which the court
always relieves." In Hankle v. Royal -Exchange, 1Yes. Sr. 318,
the bill sought to reform a written policy after loss had actually
happened, upon the ground that it did not express the intent of
the contracting parties. Lord HAIRDWICKE said: "No doubt but
this court has jurisdiction to relieve in respect of a plain mistake
in contracts in writing as well as against frauds in contracts; so
that if reduced into writing contrary to the intent of the parties,
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on proper proof, that would be rectified." In Gillespie v. Moon, 2
Johns. Ch. 593, Chanc. KENT examined the question both upon principle and authority, and said: "I have looked into most if not all
of the cases in this branch of equity jurisdiction, and it appears to
me established, and on great and essential grounds of justice, that
relief can be had against any deed or contract in writing founded in
mistake or fraud. The mistake may be shown by parol proof, and
the relief granted to the injured party, whether he sets up the tnistake affirmatively by bill, or as a defence." In the same case he
saidl: "It appears to be the steady language of the English
chancery for the last seventy years, and of all the compilers of
the doctrines of that court, that a party may be admitted to show,
by parol proof, a mistake, as well as fraud, in the execution of a
deed or other writing." And such is the settled law of this court:
Graves v. Boston lar.Ins. Co., 2 Cranch 443 ; Insurance v. Wil
kinson, 13 Wall. 231; Bradford v. Union Bank, 13 How. 66;
Hfearne v. Marine Insurance Co., 20 Wall. 490, 496. It would
be a serious defect in the jurisdiction of courts of equity if they
did not have the power to grant relief against mutual mistakes or
fraud in the execution of written instruments. Of course parol
proof in all such cases is to be received with great caution, and
where the mistake is denied, should never be made the foundation
of a decree, variant from the written contract, except it be of the
clearest and most satisfactory character. Nor should relief be
granted where the party seeking it has unreasonably delayed application for xedress, or where the circumstances raise the presumption that he acquiesced in the written agreement, after becoming
aware of the mistake. Hence, in Graves v. Boston MTtar. Ins. Co.,
2 Cranch 419, this court declined to grant relief against an alleged
mistake in the execution of a policy, partly because the plaintiff's
agent had possession of the policy long enough to ascertain its
contents, and retained it several months before alleging any mistake in its reduction to writing. But no such state of case exists
here. The policy in question was retained for Keith by the insurance agents. It was not surrendered to him, and he did not see it
until after the loss had happened. Immediately upon being advised by his attorney that the policy as written did not cover the
interest of the firm in the cotton, but only his individual interest,
Keith promptly avowed the mistake, and asked that the policy be
corrected in conformity with the original agreement. .There was
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no such acceptance by him of the written policy as would justify
the inference that he had waived any rights existing under the
original agreement, or had conceded that instrument to be a correct statement of the contract of insurance.
It may be said that the mistake made out was a mistake of law,
and, therefore, not reformable in equity. It was said in Runt v.
Roumanier,1 Peters 15, to be the general rule that a mistake of
lav; is not a ground for reforming a deed founded on such mistake,
and that the exceptions to the rule were not only few in number,
but had something peculiar in their character. The chief justice,
however, was careful in that case to say that it was not the intention of the court "to lay it down, that there may not be cases in
which a court of equity will relieve against a plain mistake, arising
from ignorance of law." He said that he had found no case in the
books, in which it has been decided that a plain and acknowledged
mistake in law was beyond the reach of equity. In 1 Story's Eq.
Jur., sec. 138, e andf, Redfield's edition' the author, after stating
certain qualifications to be observed in granting relief upon the
ground of mistake of law, says that "the rule that an admitted or
clearly established misapprehension of the law does create a basis.
for the interference of courts of equity, resting on discretion, and
to be exercised only in the most unquestionable and flagrant cases,
is certainly more in consonance with the best considered and best
reasoned cases upon the point, both English and American." The
same author says: "We trust the principle, that cases may and do
occur where courts of equity feel compelled to grant relief, upon
the mere ground of the misapprehension of a clear rule of law,
which has so long maintained its standing among the fundamental
rules of equity jurisprudence, is yet destined to afford the basis of
many wise and just decrees, without infringing the general rule
that mistake of law is presumptively no sufficient ground of equitable interference."
In the case under consideration the alleged mistake is proven to
the entire satisfaction of the court. It is equally clear that the
assent of Keith to the insurance being made in his name was superinduced by the representation of the company's agent, that insurance, in that form, would fully protect the interest of the firm
in the cotton. Assuming, as we must from the evidence, that this
representation was not made with any intention to mislead or entrap
the assured, it is, however, evident that Keith reliedupon that repre-
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sentation, and, not unreasonably, relied also upon the larger experience and greater knowledge of the insurance agents in all matters concerning the proper mode of consummating, by written
agreement, contracts of insurance according to the understanding
of the parties. He trusted the insurance agents with the preparation of the written agreement, which should correctly express the
meaning of the contracting parties. He is not chargeable with
negligence because he rested in the belief that the policy would be
prepared in conformity with the contract. As soon as be had a
reasonable opportunity to consult counsel he discovered the mistake,
and insisted upon the rights secured .by the original agreement. A
court of equity could not deny relief under such circumstances,
without enabling the insurance company to obtain an unconscionable advantage through a mistake for which its agents were chiefly
responsible. In all such cases, there being no laches on the part
of the party in discovering and alleging the mistake, equity will lay
hold of any additional circumstances, fully established, which will
justify its interposition to prevent marked injustice being done:
Wheeler v. Smith, 9 How. 82.
In deciding, therefore, as we do, that the complainants are entitled to have the policy reformed in accordance with the original
agreement, it is not perceived that we enlarge or depart, in any just
sense, from the general and salutary rule that a mere mistake of
law, stripped of all other circumstances, constitutes no ground for
the reformation of written contracts.
We have.not overlooked, in this connection, that portion of the
evidence which shows that Holmes & Bro., when advising the company by letter, of the contract of insurance, stated in a postscript
that the insurance would be for a few days only. The officers of
the company testify that they would not have permitted the contract to stand, but would have promptly cancelled the policy, had
they not supposed the insurance would last but a few days. It
was doubtless the belief of Keith, which he expressed to the insurance agents, that the cotton would remain at West Point for a few
days only. The evidence shows that he had reasonable ground
for such belief. But he seems to have guarded against disappointment in that respect by having it distinctly agreed that the insurance should last until transportation could be obtained, and the
.cotton shipped from West Point. That Holmes & Bro. so understood the agreement is evident from their letter of December 6th
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1865, to the secretary of the defendant company, in which they
state that they had taken insurance " on 220 bales of cotton stored
in open shed at West Point, Miss., said cotton to remain insured
from above, date till time of shipment." It is true that the response
of the secretary shows that the company did not approve of such
character of risks, but they did not repudiate the contract or require
it to be cancelled, and only enjoined upon their agents "to decline
such business in future." The act of the agents in filling up the
blanks in the policy -after the loss had occurred was manifestly in
consummation of the original contract of insurance.
But independent of the issue in the pleadings, as to the mistake
in reducing the contract to writing, the company defends the action
and denies its liability, upon several grounds, which must now be
considered.
2. The answer alleges that at the time, and prior to the alleged
verbal contract of insurance, the cotton referred to in the bill was
guarded, night and day, by soldiers of the United States, the shed
in which the cotton was stored being occupied by such soldiers,
who were in the habit of sleeping and eating their meals upon the
cotton, and smoking and otherwise using fire upon and in its immediate vicinity; that those facts were material to the risk, and would,
or might have influenced Holmes & Bro. and the company in taking the insurance, or in regard to the rate of premium to be
charged, and that such facts, although well known to Keith when
he applied for insurance, were not communicated by him to Holmes
& Bro., or to the company, but were concealed, whereby the contract of insurance, whether reduced to writing correctly or not,
became, and was void.
The evidence does not authorize a defence upon such grounds.
The proof does not justify the belief that Keith, when applying for
insurance, withheld any fact known to him and material to the
risk. By the terms of the policy he was under an obligation to
make a just, full and true exposition of all the facts and circumstances in regard to the condition, situation, value and risk of the
property insured, so far as the same were known to.him, and were
material to the risk. 'The same clause of the policy provides that
the risk shall cease, and the policy become null and void, "if any
material fact or circumstance shall not have been fairly represented." This language must, of course, be construed in connection with the preceding words of the same clause. We find no
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evidence in the record showing that Keith did not fairly represent
every material fact known to him. Rawley, who was within hearing of the conversation between Keith and Edgar Holmes (the.
active manager of the business of Holmes & Bro.), says, that while
lie cannot recall the language used, he is "positive that Keith
explained the character of the risk. * * * I know Keith described
the character of the risk fully." When Keith applied to Edgar
Holmes for the insurance, the latter asked him how the cotton was
stored. He replied that it was "stored in an open shed." Holmes
then said to him that he did not like the manner in which it was
stored, and Keith replied: "The cotton was guarded day and
night." Thus were Holmes & Bro. notified of its exact condition
and situation. The information that the cotton was guarded day
and night, indicated that there was something in the surrounding
circumstances which made a guard necessary for its safety. Indeed,
if it was to remain, while under insurance, in an open shed, and
at a point remote from the company's place of business, it was
clearly in the interest of ihe insurer to have it guarded day and
night. But it is said that the habits of the guard were such, at
the time of the insurance, as to endanger its safety. If this were
clearly proven, the evidence furnishes no ground .for imputing to
Keith, or Snell, or Taylor, knowledge of any habitual carelessness
or misconduct upon the part of the guard, which increased the danger of the cotton being burned.
3. The answer further alleges that on the 8th December 1865,
whatever cotton there was in the shed at West Point, belonging to
the complainants, was seized by the United States government, or by
its officers, under its orders and direction, excluding complainants
thereafter from all possession and control over the cotton, and that
such seizure and exclusion from possession and control were maintained until the cotton was burned; that after such seizure the
shed passed to the exclusive possession of soldiers of the United
States, who were in the habit of using the same for military defence, of sleeping and eating therein, and of smoking and otherwise
using fire upon and in its immediate vicinity; that at the time of
the alleged verbal contract of insurance, large' quantities of loose
cotton were lying under the flooring of the shed, which consisted
of loose boards, and immediately under the cotton stored in the
shed, whereby the risk of fire was greatly increased; that these
facts were, each and all of them, material to the risk, and would or
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might have influenced the judgment of Holmes & Co. and of the
company, in regard to the continuing thereof, or in regard to the
rate of premium therefor; that these facts were known to Taylor
on the 8th December 1865, and in ample time before the fire to
have communicated the same, and sufficiently long before to have
enabled the defendant to cancel the policy and give complainants
ample notice thereof; that by reason of the concealment of these
facts by Taylor from the company and its agents, the policy became
and was wholly void.
This defence is doubtless based upon that clause which declares
that "if the situation or circumstances affecting the risk thereupon
(the property) shall be so altered and changed, either by change of
occupancy in the premises insured, or containing property insured,
or from adjacent exposure, whereby the hazard is increased, and the
assured fail to notify the company, or if the title to said property
shall be in any way changed, * * * in every such case the risk
thereupon shall cease and determine, and the policy be null and

void."
It will be observed that no alteration or change in the occupancy
of the premises containing the insured property avoids the policy,
in the absence of notice to the insurer, unless it be such alteration
or change as increased the hazard. We have already seen that the
company's agents were informed, when the contract was made, that
the cotton was guarded by day and by night. There was no change
in the character of the guard, except that prior to December 8th
1865, it was guarded by Federal soldiers, as a personal favor to
Taylor, while after that date it was guarded by the same soldiers
under an order from Federal officers for the seizure of the cotton.
There is some evidence that the soldiers were, at times, negligent
and careless, but we are not satisfied that their conduct in and
about the property was such as to increase the hazard. The strong
presumption is that, in view of the peculiar condition of public sentiment at West Point and its vicinity, against Taylor and others
who had been officially connected with the seizure and collection of
cotton, under treasury regulations, the presence of Federal soldiers
largely decreased, rather than increased, the hazard, and was, therefore, for the benefit of all parties interested in its preservation.
We attach no weight to its seizure, under orders of Federal officers, as, in and of itself, affecting the rights of the assured. It
appears satisfactorily from the evidence that it had been purchased
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by Taylor for the firm of which he was a member, and with money
furnished for that purpose by the firm. It does not appear that
any of the cotton claimed by him for the firm, did, in fact, belong
to the United States, or that it had become forfeited to the United
States by reason of his violation of the laws of the United States,
or of treasury regulations made in pursuance of such laws. Nor
does it appear that he caused or promoted its seizure by officers of
the United States. So far as the record shows, it was an unauthorized seizure of the private property of the citizen, caused by
the personal hostility towards Taylor of one who had himself been
suspended from his position as a treasury cotton agent, through the
influence or machinations, as he suspected or believed, of Taylor.
If, as alleged, the cotton, upon its seizure, passed from the control
of the owner to the exclusive possession and control, for the time,
of Federal officers, such change of control and possession did not,
by the terms of the policy, impose upon the insured the duty of
communicating to the company the fact of such change. It was
only when the change in the surrounding circumstances increased
the hazard that the assured was, by the terms of the policy, under
an obligation to inform the company thereof. If the seizure of the
cotton had involved a change in the title to the property, then the
company could have elected to avoid the policy, since it contains
express stipulations to that effect. But, as already said, the record
furnishes no evidence of any change in title, but only a change of
possession and control, without the assent, and, perhaps, beyond the
power of the owner to prevent, and which does not clearly appear
to have increased the hazard.
4. We come now to the only remaining question which it seems
necessary to consider, viz., the quantity of cotton in the shed, belonging to Snell, Taylor & Co., at the time of the fire. * * *
[Here the judge reviewed the evidence upon the question of fact,
not of any general interest.]
The decree of the court below is reversed, with directions to enter
a final decree in conformity with this opinion.
The general maxim that ignorance or
mistake of the law is no excuse, either
for a breach, or for an omission of duty,
is well settled, both at law and in equity.
The maxim does not, however, apply to
the laws of another state or country,
mistakes as to the laws of which stand
VOL. XXVII.-12

upon the same footing as mistakes of
fact: Haven v. Foster, 9 Pick. 130;
Kenny v. Clarkson, I John. 385; McCormick- v. Garnett, 5 DeG., M1.& G. 278.
It was said -also, by Lord WESTBORT,
in Cooper v. Phibbs, L. R. 2 H. L. 170,
that the maxim applies- only to the
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general law of the country, and not to
mere private right, e. g. title to property;
and that private right of ownership is
a matter of fact; a distinction which
will be again referred to further on.
Although, however, the authorities generally lay down the rule, that, where
there has been a fall knowledge of all
the facts, equity will not relieve against
mere mistakes in matters of law (1
Story's Eq. Jur. a 113, 116; Snell's
Eq. (4th ed.) 428 ; Willard's Eq. Jur.
*60), there are certain exceptional
cases, and the true boundaries of the
rule in equity seem involved in considerable doubt. The rule is laid down by
Judge STORY (I Eq. Jur. 116), that
"lAgreements made and acts done under
a mistake of law are (if not otherwise
objectionable) generally held valid and
obligatory;" "that a mistake of law is
not ground for reforming a deed founded
on-such mistake. And, whatever exveptions there may be to this rule, they
Are not only few in number, but they
will be found to have something pe,uliar in their character, and to involve
,ther elements of decision." See, also,
I Story's Eq. Jar. 137 ; Willard's
Eq. Jar. *60; Burd v. Hall, 12 Wise.
124 ; Jordan v. ,tevens, 51 Me. 81.
The cases usually mentioned as exceptions are:
(I) Where a party has acted under a
misconception as to, or ignorance of,
his title to the property, respecting
which some agreement has been made,
or conveyance executed, as to which,
so far as concerns mistakes of law,
Judge STORY remarks : "That many,
although not all of the cases, will be
found to have turned, not upon the consideration of a mere mistake of law,
stripped of all other circumstances, but
upon an admixture of other ingredients
going to establish misrepresentation,
imposition, undue confidence, undue influence, mental imbecility, or that sort
of surprise which equity uniformly regards as a just foundation for relief:"

I Story's Eq. Jar. 120. See, also,
Whelen's Appeal, 70 Penn. St. 410,
427.
Under this head comes the doctrine,
that, where a party, acting in ignorance
of a plain and settled principle of law, is
induced to give up a portion of his undisputed property to another, under the
name of a compromise, equity will relieve him from the effects of his mistake:
I Story's Eq. Jur. 121 ; Freeman v.
Curtis, 51 Me. 140. See also Willard's
Eq. Jur. (Potter's ed.) *68; as to which
Judge STORY'S explanation is, that,
where the party acts upon the misapprehension that he has no title at all to
the property, it seems to involve in
some measure a mistake of fact of ownership, arising from a mistake of law;
(see also Cooper v. Pibs,supra; Freeman v. Curtis, supra) ; and that the case
of a mistake of a plain and understood
rule of property might well give rise to
a presumption that there has been some
undue influence, imposition, mental imbecility, surprise, or confidence abused,
in which case the mistake of law is not
the foundation of relief, but only the
medium of proof to establish some
other proper ground of relief: I Story's
Eq. Jur. a 122, 128, 130; Snell's Eq.
(4th ed.) 429. The first explanation
seems unsatisfactory, and concerning it
Judge REDFIELD has well said: (I
Story's Eq. Jur. (Redfield's ed.) 130
note, 138 a), that "the idea of there
existing in this class of cases a mistake
of fact as well as of law, might, perkaps with equal force apply to all cases
of mistake of law. The true state of
the law is always a fact. * * * * In
regard to the law of the place of the
forum, both the court and the parties
are presumed to know it, and are bound
to take notice of it. It is rather upon
this ground, we apprehend, that courts
of equity decline to interfere and grant
relief upon the basis of alleged mistakes
of the law of the forum, than because
there is any inherent difference between
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a bosa fide misapprehension of law and 11 Ohio 480; Stockbridge Iron Co, v.
of fact, or between the mistake of the Hudson Iron Co.,.107 Mass. 290; Beardslaw of the forum and that of a foreign leg v. Knight, 10 Verm. 185 ; Green v.
state. * * * The distinction between Morris, 4-c., Railroad, 12 N. J. Eq. 165 ;
mistakes of law and of fact, so far as Canedy v. MarcyJ, 13 Gray 373; Champequitable relief is concerned, is one of tinv. Latin, 1 Edw. Ch. 467; s. c.
policy rather than principle." See Jor- 6 Paige 189 ; 18 Wend. 407. See, also,
dan v. Sevens, 51 Me. 80. It may also Cockerell v. Cholmdey, 1 Russ. & Myl.
be observed of the first of Judge STORY'S 418 ; State v. Paup, 13 Ark. 129.
Subject to the above exceptions, it
explanations, above quoted, that, if allowed its proper latitude, it would, as may perhaps be considered a.settled by
it seems, annihilate all distinction be- authority that a mere mistake in matter
tween mistakes of law and of fact.
of general law (as distinguished from
The cases upon this point have., also, private right), stripped of all other cirbeen attempted to be reconciled upon the cumstances, is not ground for reforming
distinction, before alluded to, between a written contract founded on such misthe wordjus, as used to indicate general take : 1 Story's Eq. Jur. (Redfield's
law, and the same word as employed to ed.) ; 113, 138-138b; Bank of United
denote private right, a mistake as to States v. Daniel, 12 Pet. 32, 55, 56 ;
the general law being irremediable in Stover v. Poole, 67 Me. 217 ; Glenn v.
equity, while a mistake in regard to in- Statler, 42 Iowa 107. Judge STORY
dividual rights may, it is said, under States (1 Equity Jur.
138) that the
certain circumstances be redressed : present disposition of courts of equity
Cooper v. Phibbs, supra; Bisp. Eq. (2d is to narrow rather than to enlarge the
cd.) sect. 187. Whatever may be the operation of the exception. See, also,
explanation of the before stated doctrine Snell's Eq. (4th ed.) 428, 429; 1
as to compromises, the exception itself Story's Equity Jur. 120 ; Willard's
seems settled upon authority :Naylor v. Eq. Jur. *60, 64. Judge REDFIELD
Winch, 1 Sim. & Stu. 555; Jones v. seems to favor a more liberal viewMunroe, 32 Geo. 188 ; Freeman v. Cur- though he is not very definite in stating
tis, supra; 1 Story's Eq. Jur. 121.
the limits of the exceptions; see 1
(2) Another apparent exception is Story's Eq. Jur. (Redfield's ed.) 138 awhere, through ignorance or mistake of 138 I-and sums up the principles apthe law as to the proper mode of fram- plicable to mistakes in law by stating
ing the instrument, there has been a that " where the mistake is of so fundadefective execution of the intent of the mental a nature that the minds of the
parties, in which case equity will grant parties have never in fact met, or where
relief: I Story's Equity Jur. § 136 ; an unconscionable advantage has been
Pitcher v. Hennessey, 48 N. Y. 424;
gained by mere mistake or misapprehenMaher v. Hibernia Ins. Co., 67 Id. 283; sion, and there was no gross negligence
Sparks v. Pittman, 51 ]fiss. 511 ; Long- on the part of the plaintiff, either in
hurst v. Star Ins. CQ., 19 Iowa 364 ; falling into the error, or in not sooner
Pickett v. Merchants' Nat. Bank, 32 claiming redress, and no intervening
Ark. 346; Hunt v. Rousnaniere, I Pet. rights have .accrued, and the parties
13; Stover v. Poole, 67 Me. 217, 223 ; may still be placed in statu quo, equity
Adams v. Stevemq, 49 Id. 362; Wood- will interfere in its discretion to'prevent
bury &avings Bank v. Charter Oak Ins. intolerable injustice."
See, also, StoCo., 31 Conn. 517 ; Oliverv. Mut. Com. ver v. Poole, 67 Me. 217, 223. The
Ins. Co., 2 Curt. C. C. 277 ; Larkins v. above may probably be considered as
Biddle, 21 Ala. 252 ; Evants v. Strode, definite a statement of the law upon the
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subject as the present state of the authorities will warrant, the rule being as yet
not entirely settled.
Courts of equity however, as stated
in the principal case, will be vigilant to
lay hold of any extraneous circumstances which will justify their interposition to prevent marked injustice
being done: I Story's Eq. Jur. (Redfield's ed.)
138 c, note; Bisp. Eq.
(2d ed.)
188. They will relieve
against a mistake of law even when
brought about by innocent misrepresentation. (See the cases cited at the
end of this note.) And where a mistake is manifest, and it is doubtful
whether it is a mistake of law or of
fact, they will presume it to be a mistake of fact, until it is shown that all
the facts were known: Hurd v. Hall,
12 Wis. 112, 131.

Returning to the principal case, it
seems to be very clearly correct ; for, as
stated by the court, "IThe written agreement did not effect that which the
parties intended," and had previously
agreed upon; which would bring the
case within the second class of cases
above referred to. Moreover, the mistake was induced by the representation
of the insurance agent that the policy as
written would fully protect the interest
of the firm; and, as we have seen, a
mistake of law, caused by misrepresentation, though innocent, is a ground
of equitable relief: see ff'oodbury 5evings Bank v. Charter Oak Ins. Co., 31
Conn. 517 ; Longhurst v. Star Ins. Co.
19 Iowa 364 ; Jordan v. Stevens, 51 Me.
78 ; Freenan v. Curtis, Id. 140 ; Green
v. Morris, j-c. R. R., 12 N. J. Eq. 165.
MARSHA LT- D. EWELL.

Supreme Court of Michigan.
JOHN M cEWEN v. CHARLES ZIMMER:
By a statute of the dominion of Canada, a judgment is permitted to be rendered
against a person resident abroad, on a service made upon him out of the dominion.
A citizen of Michigan was sued in Canada and service of process made in Michigan.
He did not appear in the suit, and judgment was taken by default. Suit being
brought on the judgment in Michigan, Held, that it was a nullity.
No sovereignty can subject persons not within its limits to the jurisdiction of its
courts by constructive service, or by service made within the limits of another
sovereignty.

THIs was an action upon a judgment purporting to have been
rendered by the county court of county Essex, in the Province
of Ontario, Dominion of Canada, in favor of McEwen against Zimmer. The only question which the record presented was one of
jurisdiction in the county court of Essex to render the judgment,
and this arose upon the service which was made upon the defendant.
Zimmer was proceeded against as a non-resident under certain provisions of the statutes, known as the Consolidated Statutes of Upper

Canada, by which upon a cause of action arising in Upper Canada
-

a writ is allowed to be issued and served upon the defendant out-

side the jurisdiction of Canada, and upon such service the action
may proceed to judgment.
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Zimmer, it was conceded, was not a British subject, and the
record of the judgment in the county court showed that the only
service made upon him was made at the city of Detroit, in this
state. It also showed that he did not, in any manner, respond to the
service, and that judgment was taken against him by default. No
property appeared to have been attached in the province, and no
jurisdiction to render the judgment was claimed, unless the service
in Detroit conferred it. The court below held that the judgment
was a nullity.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
COOLEY, J.-The only question the record presents may be
stated as follows : Whether it is competent for a foreign court to
make service of its process in this state, and on the authority of
such service to proceed to judgment against a party who refuses to
recognise the jurisdiction.
We had not supposed, until this suit was brought to our attention, that such a jurisdiction could seriously be contended for. The
rule laid down by Judge STORY in his Conflict of Laws has been supposed to be of universal acceptance, fiat "no sovereignty can extend
its process beyond its own territorial limits, to subject either persons or property to its judicial decisions. Every exertion of
authority of this sort beyond this limit is a mere nullity, and incapable of binding such persons or property in any other tribunals." Confl. of Laws, § 539. Mr. Wharton repeats this rule, as
one not questioned: Confl. of Laws, § 712; and it is believed to
have been recognised in every case arising in the courts of this
country in which the exact point has been presented. If any case
is an exception, it has escaped our attention.
It is urged, however, that the rule in Great Britain and the
British provinces is otherwise, and that comity requires that we
recognise and accept the rule of jurisdiction that prevails where
the judgment was rendered. The obligations of international
comity, we trust, will never be questioned in this state, especially
when they are invoked in behalf of our neighbors of the Dominion,
with whom our relations are so intimate, and it may be added, so
friendly and cordial. We should certainly never have the assurance to demand from them more than we would freely and voluntarily concede to them. True comity is -equality, we should demand nothing more and concede nothing less.
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The English decisions having direct bearing on the question are
not very numerous: Douglasv. Forrest,4 Bing. 686, was an action
in England upon a Scotch judgment, obtained without personal
service, and after notice to the defendant by the process called
"horning," which may or may not have ever come to his knowledge. The validity of the judgment was recognised, and the action
sustained. But an inspection of the case and a reading of the
opinion of Chief Justice BEST will disclose the fact that the rule,
as laid down by Mr. Justice STORY, in his treatise on the Conflict
of Laws, is in no manner assailed or questioned. The defendant was
executor of a Scotch estate, and it was in that capacity that he was
sued; and the jurisdiction was supported on the express ground
that the estate was within the jurisdiction of the Scotch court, and
that the defendant himself owed allegiance to that country. "To
be sure," says the chief justice, "if attachments issued against
persons who were never within the jurisdiction of the court issuing
them could be supported and enforced in the country in which the
person attached resided, the legislature of any country might
authorize their courts to decide on the rights of parties who owed
no allegiance to the governmeht of such country, and were under
no obligation to attend its courts or obey its laws. We confine our
judgment to a case where a party owed allegiance to the country in
which the judgment was so given against him, from being born in
it, and by the laws of which country his property was, at the time
those judgments were given, protected. The debts were contracted
in the country in which the judgments were given whilst the
debtor resided in it."
In Bequet v. McCarthy, 2 B. &. Ad. 951, the judgment in question was rendered in one of the British colonies, and by the law
of the colony, if the defendant was absent and could not be personally served, the service was permitted to be made on the king's
attorney-general for the colony. It was so made in that case; the
defendant, who was an official lately domiciled in the colony, being
then absent. The substituted service was sustained as sufficient.
It was made within the jurisdiction of the court, and the case is
therefore not analogous to the present, and we have no occasion
either to approve or question it. Our laws provide in some cases
for a substitute for personal service where the party is within the
jurisdiction or only temporarily absent, and where the substitute
is such as with reasonable certainty will bring the proceeding to the
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knowledge of the respondent, it is perhaps competent to give to
such service the full effect of that made upon a person, but no such
question is now before us.
In Bank of Australasiav. .Nias,16 Q. B. 717, the defendant,
who was a stockholder in a joint stock company in New South
Wales, was sued in England on a liability as such stockholder,
which it was claimed was established by a judgment against the
chairman of the company in New South Wales, under a statute
which permitted the chairman to be sued as representative of the
company. The statute was sustained, and the action was supported. Lord CAMPBELL, in his opinion, declares that the statute
was passed for the benefit of the company, and that there was
nothing at all repugnant to the law of England, or to the principles of natural justice, in enacting that actions upon contracts
made by the company, instead of being brought individually
against all the stockholders, should be brought against the chairman
whom they had appointed to represent them. The case is treated
as one in which the .parties, by accepting the benefits of a statute,
had consented to certain forms of procedure for which it provided.
A case more important to the present discussion i§ that of Schzisby
v. "Westenholz, Law Rep. 6 Q. B. 155. The action in that. case
was upon a French judgment, obtained without personal service
of process, under a statute not differing essentially from the statute
of Upper Canada, which is supposed to sustain the judgment now
in question. The only difference of moment between that case and
the present is that there the contract on which the French court
gave judgment was an English contract, while in this case the
judgment was given for services performed by the plaintiff in
Canada, and possibly it may be claimed that the implied contract
to pay for these services was a Canada contract, though the defendant was not in Canada at the time. Whether this difference
has any legal significance will be considered further on. Putting
this circumstance aside, the two cases are strictly analogous, and it
is fortunate that, in passing upon the force that should be given to
a Canadian judgment under the circumstances, 'we are afforded the
light of a decision by one of the courts at Westminster on The very
point in dispute.
It should be stated here that the statute of Upper Canada was a
substantial reproduction in that province of the provisions of the
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English Common Law Procedure Act (1852), which in terms permit judgment to be taken against persons out of the realm on a
service of process made abroad. The case was therefore one in
which it might be urged with great force that comity required thatthe courts in England should recognise the validity of judgments
obtained in France upon a service precisely analogous to that which
the English statute made sufficient to support a judgment in tnat
country. BLACKBURN, J., in delivering the opinion of the court,
proceeded to declare as the true principle on which the judgments
of foreign tribunals are enforced in England, that stated by PARKE,
B., in Russell v. Smyth, 9 M. & W. 819, and repeated in Williams v. Jones, 13 M. & W. 633, that the judgment of a court of
competent jurisdiction over the defendant imposes a duty or obligation on the defendant to pay the sum for which judgment is given,
which the courts of England are bound to enforce, and that consequently anything which negatives that duty or forms a legal excuse
for not performing it, is a defence to the action, proceeds to say :
"1We were much pressed on the argument with the fact that the
British legislature has, by the Common Law Procedure Act (1852),
conferred on our courts a power of summoning foreigners, under certain circumstances, to appear, and in case they do not, giving judgment against them by default. It was this consideration principally which induced me at the trial to entertain the opinion which
I then expressed and have since changed; and we think that if the
principle on which foreign judgments were enforced was that which
is loosely called "comity," we could hardly decline to enforce a
foreign judgment given in France against a resident of Great Britain, under circumstances hardly, if at all, distinguishable from
those under which we, mutatis mutandis, might give judgment
against a resident in France; but it is quite different if the principle be that which we have just laid down. Should a foreigner be
sued under the provisions of the statute referred to, and then come
to the courts of this country and desire to be discharged, the only
question which our courts could entertain would be whether the acts
of the British legislature, rightly construed, gave us jurisdiction
over this foreigner, for we must obey them. But if judgment being
given against him in our courts, an action were brought upon it in
the courts of the United States-where the law as to the enforcing
foreign judgments is the same as our own-a further question would
be opened, viz., not only whether the British legislature had given
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the English courts jurisdiction over the defendant, but whether he
was under any obligation which the American courts could recognise, to submit to the jurisdiction thus created." And further on
he says that the real question which the court of the United States
must pass upon in the supposed case would be this: Can the island
of Great Britain pass a law to bind the whole world? A question
which he ventures to answer without hesitation in the negative.
But for a single remark in this opinion by Mr. Justice BLACKBURN, it should, as it seems to us, be accepted on all sides as covering completely the present case. The remark referred to is in
the nature of a suggestion, that if at the time when the obligation
was contracted the defendants were in a foreign country, but left it
before the suit was instituted, perhaps the laws of the foreign country ought to bind them. The remark was not relevant to any facts
then before the court, nor, in our opinion, does the present case

require us to consider how far the suggestion has force. This defendant was not in Canada when the demand accrued, and in no
manner has he submitted himself to its laws, unless he can be said
to have done so in employing the services of the plaintiff in that
country. If we might assume, which we cannot under the circumstances, that the supposed contract was a Canada contract, it is not
by any means clear to our minds that the fact should affect the decision. If the obligation on the courts of one country to enforce
the judgments of another be grounded in comity, it ought to appear that under corresponding circumstances it would be expected
in this state that the courts of Canada would enforce a judgment
given in Michigan on a Michigan contract against a resident of
Canada, who was never served with process, except in the Dominion.
So far is it from being the fact that such an expectation would exist, that the courts of this state are not permitted, by virtue of any
statute or of any principles supposed to be derived from the common law, to render any such judgment; and should it by inadvertence, or by mistake of law, be entered up by any court of this state,
any other court, and indeed the party defendant, might treat it, so
far as it assumes to establish a personal demand against him, as an
absolute nullity. No better illustration of the.views held by our
own courts upon this subject cn be instanced than the case of fQreclosure suits in equity against non-resident mortgagors where, although the case may proceed to decree on notice given by publication, or personally served in a foreign jurisdiction, yet the 'notice
VOL.
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is never accepted as the full substitute for service of precess within
the state, and though the case goes to a decree for the sale of the
land, a personal decree against the party liable for the mortgage
debt is never permitted to be taken upon such notice: Lawrence
v. Fellows, Walk. Ch. 468; Outwhite v. Porter, 13 Mich. 533;
Tyler v. Peatt, 30 Mich. 63. We may then dismiss comfty from
consideration as constituting any basis for the enforcement of the
judgment now before us. We should certainly, mutatis mutandis,
not expect it to be enforced. And we may add that in the still
more pointed case of the attachment of lands of a non-resident as
the commencement of a suit to collect a debt, though the statute
provides for the case proceeding to judgment against the defendant
on proof of the statutory notice by publication, yet the judgment is
not regarded as establishing a personal demand against the defendant, and we should neither expect it to be enforced as such abroad,
nor enforce it ourselves. This is so well understood in this state
that the point is never mooted.
On the other hand, if the obligation to enforce a foreign judgment is to be rested on the duty or obligation of the defendant to
pay the sum for which the judgment was given, as Mr. Baron
PARKE and Mr. Justice BLACKBURN suppose, then it is important
to know from what such duty or obligation springs. It is certain
that it cannot spring from the mere fact that some court has assumed to render a judgment, but the proceedings anterior to the
judgment must have been such as fairly imposed upon the party
sued the obligation to appear and make his defence to the demands
set up, if any he have; and if, under the circumstances, he was
fairly entitled to treat any notice of the suit which may have been
given him as unwarranted, and to disregard it, then it seems plain
that no obligation to recognise the conclusions of the court could
possibly arise. The question, then, seems to be narrowed to this:
whether the service of process beyond the jurisdiction of the court
issuing it, can impose upon the party served the obligation to appear in the- suit and make there his defence, if he has any ? If
this question must be answered in the affirmative as regards ajudgment rendered in Canada, it must receive a like answer when it
contemplates a judgment rendered on a like service in New Zealand, or in one of the colonial courts of the Dutch East Indies.
The question, therefore, is not one to be disposed of on a consideration of merely how this defendant might be affeted ; but it sug-
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gests the possible cases of citizens of this country proceeded against
in the remotest borders of civilization, on claims which may or may
not have a foundation in justice, but which become established
claims by default in making answer to a suit upon them.
Now the service of process is for the purpose of notifying the defendant, and giving him a fair opportunity to defend. But the service of process in Michigan, which requires one to appear and answer to a demand in a foreign country would in general be of no
value whatever, because a defence abroad would either be practically impossible, or would be so expensive as to exceed in cost the
importance of the demand. It may therefore justly and emphatically be declared that such service would give no fair opportunity
to defend, and consequently could not accomplish the purpose of
process. Were the doctrine accepted which would permit it, it
might reasonably be anticipated that fictitious claims would be asserted abroad against Americans, who, for business or pleasure,
had visited foreign countries, and would become established claims
by default in a defence which a party wrongfully charged could not
afford to make. We think the doctrine has no foundation in reason,
or in the principles of international law or international comity.
We refer, as supporting these general views; to Bischoff v.
Wetherall, 9 Wall. 812, and Wood v. Parsons, 27 Mich. 159.
Also to People v. Dawell, 25 Mich. 247, where the general subject
received some attention.
We find no error in the judgment, and it must be affirmed with
costs.
The same conclusion has been reached
by the courts of many of the states, in
the following cases, amongst others :
McVicer v. Budy, 31 Me. 314 ; Wood
v. Watkinson, 17 Conn. 500; Woodward
v. Tremure, 6 Pick. (Mass.) 354; Kane
v. Cook, 8 Cal. 449 ; Rangley v. Webster,
11 N. H. 299; Winston v. Taylor, 28
Mo. 82 ; Jones v. Spencer, 15 Wis. 583;
Pricev. Hickock, 39 Vt. 292 ; Williams
v. Preston, 3 J. J. Marsh. 600; Davidson v. Sharpe, 6 Ired. L. 14; Arndt v.
Arndt, 15 Ohio 83 ; Whittier v. Wendell,
7 N. H. 257 ; Miller v. Miller, I Bailey
(S. C.) 42; Zepp v. Hagar, 70 Ill.
223; Frothingham v. Barnes, 9 R. I.
474.

The question of the validity and effect
of foreign judgments, or those of a sister state, and the reason urged in their
favor, was quite carefully and elaborately considered by Mr. Justice FIELD
in the recent case of Pennoyerv. Neff,
95 U. S. (5 Otto) 714, his conclusions
being perhaps fairly stated in a quotation
taken by him from the opinion of Mr.
Justice MILLER, in Cooper v. Reynolds,

10 Wall. 308, where, speaking of the effect of a judgment rendered in an action
commenced by attachment against a
non-resident, he says, "If the defendant appears, the cause becomes niainly
a suit in personam, with the added incident that the property attached remains
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liable, under the control of the court, to
answer to any demand which may be
established against the defendant by the
final judgment of the court. But if
there is no appearance of the defendant
and no service of process on him the
case becomes, in its essential nature, a
proceeding in ren, the only effect of
which is to subject the property attached
to the payment of the demand which the
court may find to be due to the plaintiff.
That such is the nature of the proceeding, in this latter class of cases, is clearly
evinced by two well established propositions : Ist, the judgment of the court,
though in form a personal judgment
against the defendant, has no effect beyond the property attached in that suit,
No general execution can be issued for
any balance unpaid after the attached
property is exhausted. No suit can be
maintained upon such a judgment in
the same court or any other, nor can it
be used as evidence in any other proceeding, not affecting the attached property ; nor could the costs of that proceeding be collected out of any other
property than that attached in the suit.
2d. The court, in such a suit, cannot
proceed, unless the officer finds some
property of the defendant on which to
levy the writ of attachment. A return
that none can be found is the end of the
case, and deprives the court of further
jurisdiction, though the publication may
have been duly made and proven in
coUrt."
In that case, Pennoyer v. 'eff, the
action was to recover possession of lands
held by defendant, under title acquired
at a sale, on execution issued on a personal judgment rendered without personal service or appearance, but after
service by publication in the manner
prescribed by the laws of the state of
Oregon. The defendant was not a resident of that state, but had property in
the state subject to attachment or execution, the land in question. The law of
Oregon permitted service by publication,

"where the defendant Is not a resident
of the state, but has property therein, and
the court has jurisdiction of the subject
of the action." The suit was not commenced by attachment, but the first step
taken to subject the land to the payment
or securing of the claim was the execution levy. It was claimed on the part
of the execution purchaser that, under
the clause of the statute above quoted,
no proceeding in the nature of an attachment was necessary, but that the fact
of defendants owning property in the
state was sufficient to give the court
jurisdiction, by substituted service, to
render a personal judgment which could
be enforced, at least, against such property. But the court held not: that
the jurisdiction to inquire into the obligations of a non-resident at all is only
incidental to the jurisdiction over the
property ; and until the court has obtained such jurisdiction over the property by some proceeding in the nature
of an attachment, it could obtain none
over the defendant.
The questions, which have most frequently been considered by the courts,
arising upon foreign judgments, are
those relating to the extent to which
evidence may be received, explaining or
contradicting the recitals of the judgment showing jurisdiction.
In People v. Dawell, 25 Mich. 247,
cited by Judge CooLEr in his opinion,
the record of a divorce granted by an
Indiana court was under consideration,
and it was proposed to show that the
petition, which was recited to have been
filed by the wife, was so filed by an attorney who had no authority from the
wife to do so. The opinion of the court
was upon the ground that the record of
the judgment might be impeached by a
showing that the wife had never been a
resident of Indiana, and that the court
could not, therefore, have had jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action ;
but Judge CAMPnELL, in his dissenting
opinion, discusses the question, more es-
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pecially, of the right of a party to an action based upon a judgment rendered in
another state, to show dehors the record
that he was not a resident of that state,
or within the jurisdiction of the court,
and that an attorney who appeared for
him was unauthorized. The following
cases hold that he may do so: Harrod
v. Barretto, 2 Hall (N. Y.) 302; Aldrich v. Kinney, 4 Conn. 380 ; Shumway
v. Stillman, 6 Wend. 447 ; Hall v. Williams, 6 Pick. 232; Sielton v. Tiffin, 6

How. 163; Pennywit v. Foote, 27 Ohio
St. 600 ; Serrardv. Nevins, 2 Ind. 241;
Pollard v. Baldwin, 22 Iowa 328; Norwood v. Cobb, 15 Tex. 500 ; lVatson v.
New England Bank, 4 Metc. (Mss.)
343; Houston v. Dunn, 13 Tex. 476.
For an expression of the opposite view,
see Wilcox v. Kassick, 2 Mich. 165, and
Baker v. Struebraker, 34 Mo. 172, following Warren v. Turk, 16 Id. 102.
E. A. C.

United States Circuit Court, Western District of Missouri.
BAKER v. THE KANSAS CITY TIMES CO.
In an action for libel, where defendant justifies a charge of crime, the defence
must be established to the entire satisfaction of the jury, by which is meant that
the evidence must produce an abiding conviction upon the minds of the jury of the
truth of the charge; but the defence need not be established beyond a reasonable
doubt, or with the certainty required to sustain an indictment.
In such a case the party charged with a crime is presumed to be innocent, and
the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish the guilt uf defendant, and where
there are acts or statements of the defendant fairly admitting of two meanings,
the jury should apply the meaning leading to innocence rather than guilt.
The truth of an alleged libel is, when established, a complete justification of the
publication, and bar to the action.
But a party failing to establish his plea of justification, may show, in mitigation of damages, anything tending to establish that he acted without malice or bad
intent, but from proper motives.
Absence of actual malice is no bar to an action of libel where the publication
is not privileged. The malice implied by law is sufficient upon which to maintain the action, and this cannot be febutted so as to defeat the action.
Where a plea of justification is nor sustained, it is the duty of the jury to award
damages to the plaintiff, but the amount thereof should be left to their discretion.
Semble, a party under reasonable apprehension of danger of life or great bodily
harm, has a right in self-defence to take. the life of the aggressor, but he must
have had no agency in bringing about the danger upon which he relies to justify
the taking of life.
In law, one becomes an accessory who is guilty of an act of felony, not by committing the offence in person, or as a principal, but by advising or commanding
another to commit the crime.

THIS was an action for libel; plea'justification.
ciently appear in the charge.

The facts suffi,

H. J. Leaming, A. B. Jetmore and .H.B. To7nson, for plaintiff.
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John K. Crav'ens and John IF. TWofford, for defendant.
KREKEL, J., charged the jury as follows : During the year 1877,
there were published in Topeka, in the state of Kansas, two newspapers, one called the Commonwealth, owned and controlled by
Floyd P. Baker, the plaintiff in this suit, the other called the
Blade, controlled by J. Clark Swayze. During the same year,
1877, two other newspapers were published, one in Leavenworth, in
the state of Kansas, known as the Leavenworth Times, the other
in Kansas City, in the state of Missouri, known as the Kansas City
Times, published by the defendant in this suit. The paper issued
by this corporation is under the management and control of Morrison Mumford, who has testified in the case. In the Sunday's issue
of the Kansas City Times, of April 1st 1877, a communication
appeared, dated Topeka, Kansas, March 29th 1877, signed M. C.
M., in which reference is made to Baker, plaintiff in this action, as
follows:
"The cloud of sorrow, caused by the felonious killing of J. Clark
Swayze, has not yet passed away in this city; on the contiary, it
thickens every hour, and the funeral of Mr. Swayze to-day, places
a condemnation upon the villainous part which F. P. Baker took
in the sacrifice of his life, seldom visited upon the acts of any man
* * * It was undoubtedly the object of those who conspired
against the life of Mr. Swayze-Baker in particular-to murder
the Blade by killing its editor; but in this they have signally
failed, as the numerous assurances on phrt of the business men of
Topeka, that the paper should have their undivided support, will
show. I am reliably informed that ten new names were handed
into the office last evening ag subscribers to the Blade, all of whom
had previously taken the murderer's organ."
Of these two extracts, taken from, and a part of the correspondence, Baker, the plaintiff, complains and brings his action against
the Kansas City Times for damages.
To this complaint the defendant, the Kansas City Times, answers
by setting up, first, the facts and circumstances under which the
publication was made; next, a justification, alleging "that said
letter is true, for that the said F. P. Baker did, on the 28th day of
March 1877, and for some considerable time prior thereto, encourage and countenance the said John -W. Wilson, in hostile acts
toward the said Swayze, and in assaults upon the said Swayze, by
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the said Wilson, and so encouraged and supported by plaintiff said
Wilson, did, ofl tile 28th day of 'March 1877, kill the said Swayze."
It becomes unnecessary to examine whether these pleas are technically and formally correct, for they have been. replied to and
treated as substantially sufficient. As this plea of justification disposes of the case in favor of the defendant, if found to be true, it
is proper that it should be taken up first.
You will have to ascertain, in the first place, whether the correspondence charges that Swayze was murdered-that is, killed by
Wilson, deliberately and with malice aforethought, for it would not
be murder if Wilson had killed Swayze in self-defence. Should
you come to the conclusion that the correspondence does charge
that Wilson murdered Swayze, it will become your duty, in the
second place, to ascertain whether the charge is true. The defendant, the Kansas City Times, makes this allegation and is bound to
prove it to your entire satisfaction. Now, for the purpose of ascertaining whether Wilson murdered Swayze, or acted in self-defence
when he killed him, you will bring before your mind all the facts
and circumstances testified to, existing prior to the killing, in order
to arrive at the motives and intent with which Wilson went across
the street and sought Swayze, as well as to ascertain the motives
of Swayze in acting as he did. Wilson had a right to cross the
street and remonstrate with Swayze against the publications in the
.Blade, and if that was the sole purpose with which he addressed
Swayze, Wilson was in the right. But in trying to arrive at the
intent of Wilson crossing the street and addressing Swayze, it will
be proper for you to take into consideration the existing feeling and
apprehensions of the parties, and if you shall find that Wilson calculated thereon as probably bringing about a personal difficultyseeking rather than avoiding such-he, Wilson, being prepared,
and intending, if such diiiculty occurred, to make use of it for the
purpose of killing Swayze, in such a case, Wilson cannot be said
to have acted in self-defence, and the killing of Swayze would be
murder. A party under reasonable apprehension of danger of life
or great bodily harm, has a right in self-defence to take the life of
the aggressor, but he must have had no ageney in bringing about
the danger upon which he relies to justify the taking of life.
Should you, after a careful examination and consideration of the
facts and circumstances testified to and connected with the-case,
come to the conclusion that Wilson, when he killed Swayze, acted
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in self-defence, then the defendant fails in making out his plea of
justification, and you should find that issue for plaintiff. But if
you shall find that Wilson did not act in self-defence in the killing
of Swayze, then it becomes necessary for you to consider whether
in the language of the plea of justification the plaintiff,'Baker, encouraged, countenanced and supported Wilson in the murder of
Swayze, so as to make him, Baker, accessory thereto.
In law, one becomes an accessory who is guilty of an act of felony, not by committing the offence in person, or as principal, but
by advising or commanding another to commit the crime. You are
therefore to determine from the testimony in the case whether Baker
advised or commanded the murder of Swayze. The part of the
answer setting up justification charges Baker with encouraging,
countenancing, and supporting Wilson, terms of no well-defined
legal signification when applied to a case such as the one before the
court. I construe them to mean a legal justification, namely, the
advising or commanding Wilson to murder Swayze. In trying to
arrive at a conclusion as to whether Baker advised or commanded
Wilson to murder Swayze, Baker is to be treated and considered
by you as innocent of the crime of being accessory to the murder.
of Swayze by Wilson. The guilt of Baker must be shown by the
defendant to your entire satisfaction, by which I here and elsewhere
mean that the evidence in the case must produce an abiding conviction in your mind of the guilt of Baker.
You should with care go over all the testimony in the case, and
if you find expressions used or acts done by plaintiff, Baker, fairly
admitting of two meanings, you are authorized to apply the meaning leading to innocence rather than guilt. In passing from this
plea of justification I sum up as follows:
First, ascertain from the correspondence complained of whether
it intends to charge" that Wilson murdered Swayze, and that Baker
was accessory to the murder, and if you find that this is the case,
you will next find whether Wilson did murder Swayze, or did the
killing in self-defence. If you find that Wilson acted in self-defence, that ends the plea of justification, for there could be no
murder when the killing was done in self-,defence.
If you shall find that Wilson did not kill Swayze in self-defence,
but committed a murder, you will next find whether Baker was
accessory thereto, by advising or commanding the same. If you
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shall find that Baker was not accessory to the murder, such finding
will end the plea of justification in favor of plaintiff.
If you shall find that Wilson murdered Swayze, and you shall
further find that Baker was accessory to the murder of Swayze,
such finding establishes the plea of justification, ends the case, and
you should find for defendant.
Turning from the plea of justification to the plea in mitigation
pleaded by the defendant, I proceed to present the law regarding
it, so that you may have the whole case before you.
The law, proceeding upon the presumption of innocence, assumes
when a crime is charged upon any one that he is innocent thereof,
and presumes the charge to have been maliciously made. The
author or publisher is permitted, as already explained, to show
that the charge made is really true, and that the person charged
is or has been guilty of the crime imputed to him. Upon sustaining the charge, the one making it is acquitted and stands justified,
that is if he sustain his plea of justification.
But if he fails to sustain his plea of justification, the author or
publisher may show, in mitigation of damages, anything tending
to establish that he acted without malice and bad intent, but from
proper motives.
In cases such as the one under consideration the law will not
allow the author or publisher to go free if he fails to establish his
plea of justification, though he satisfy you of the purity of his motives and the greatest prudence and care in making the publication.
The law requires publishers not only to be satisfied of the truth of
the charges he publishes, but he must also be able to establish them
to the satisfaction of a jury, in case he is sued. If the plea of justification pleaded in this case has not been made out by the defendant, it will then be necessary for you to examine into the mitigating
circumstances in evidence, so as to enable you to determine the
good faith, prudence and caution exercised by the defendant in
making the publication, as upon this, in a large measure, must depend the amount of damages which you may assess against the
defendant. You will call to mind the undisputed fact that the correspondent, Morris, was not connected with the .Kansas City Times,
and determine whether more or less care should be required at their
hands when receiving a correspondence from a stranger. The
manner in which the correspondence was received, the gravity'of
the charge and the action of the conductor of the Times, in refusing
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or neglecting to retract the charges made in the communication,
-when his attention was called to it by the plaintiff, are proper for
your consideration, es is also the duty which the conductor of a
newspaper such as the Times owes to the public, as well as the legal
obligation which he is under to the plaintiff. You are to guard, on
the one hand, the right of plaintiff, and on the other the freedom
of the press, which is measurably involved in cases of this kind.
There is no claim for special damages made by plaintiff, and none
has been proven. While it is your duty, in case the plea of justification has not been made out, to find damages against this defendant, the amount thereof is left to your discretion, which you
will exercise with due regard to the parties.
I. The court instructed the jury that
"while it is your duty, in case the plea
of justification has not been made out,
to find damages against the defendant,
the amount thereof is left to your discretion, which you will exercise with
due regard to the rights of both parties." It is submitted that the court
should have laid down definite rules by
which damages should have been measured. In True v. Plumley, 36 Maine
466, the court, at the Xisi Pris trial,
had instructed the jury as follows: c As
to damages, you will consider the pain
and anguish occasioned by defendant's
slander, the cost and trouble, the suffering occasioned by that slander, her
prospects in life as affected thereby, the
wealth and position of the defendant,
and his power therefrom to injure, and
give such damages as she is entitled to ;"
and APPLeTOx, J., speaking for the
fall Supreme Court, after reviewing the
authorities in regard to the proper rules
by which to assess damages in this class
of cases, says: "Whatever rule may be
the true one, the plaintiffs are entitled
to such damages as upon the evidence
can be awarded in conformity therewith, and not to damages assessed upon
other erroneous principles. 'Now, no
rule was given to the jury. Are they,
then, to be a law unto themselves and,
freed from all legal restraints, to assess

damages at their own will and pleasure ?
The jury were directed to give the plaintiffs the damages to which they were
entitled. To what are the plaintiffs entitled? The question unanswered recurs. To damages which are simply
compensatory, and to the full extent
of any injury sustained? To those
which would, by way of example, be
sufficient to deter others, or to such as,
beside compensating and deterring others
by example, may impose a punishment
on the defendant as for a crime, thus
infusing into the civil proceedings the
effect of a criminal procedure, and erecting the jury into a tribunal which .shall
in each case impose the penalty? Either
of these principles might have been
adopted by the jury. Which, in fact,
they did adopt we know not and cannot
know. As was remarked by RonEs,
J., in Rose v. Story, 1 Barr 190, where
somewhat similar instructions were
given, 'this is giving them discretionary powers without stint or limit,
highly dangerous to the rights of the
defendant. It is leaving them without
any rule whatever.' Most of the various
matters referred to in this instruction
might be regarded as elements proper
for the consideration of the jury; but
still some rule should have been given
to the jury, unless the law is that they
are to determine the damages without
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any restraints, and in each case according to their arbitrary discretion. * * *
A new trial must therefore be granted."
An able writer, in a recent work,
lays down the rule respecting the duty
of the court to instruct the jury as to the
rules by which they are to be governed
in arriving at the damages to be given,
as follows: "The amount of damages
is to be determined by the jury, but the
court should instruct them as to the
rules by which they should be governed
in fixing the amount. A general instruction to find such damages as, under all the circumstances, they thought
right, was held to be improper:"
Townshend on Slander and Libel,
§ 289. There is no possible distinction between the instructions condemned by these authorities and the
one given by the court in this case.
The law is clear and conclusive that
some fixed rules should have been laid
down for the ascertainment of damages : Sedg. Meas. Dam., 6th ed., 771.
The court should have directed
the jury, even though there was no
evidence of malice, t6 give compensatory damages, which would include
the cost and trouble of disproving
the libel : Armstrong v. Pierson, 8
Iowa 29; Townshend on Slander and
Libel,
289. The court should also
have instructed the jury to give such
damages as would compensate plaintiff
for all the mental suffering which would
naturally be caused by such a publication : Sedg. M1ees. Dam. 674 ; Swift v.
Diclcerman, 31 Conn. 285; Miller v.
Roy, 10 La. Ann. 231 ; Dufort v. Abadie, 23 Id. 280; Fry v. Bennett, 4 Duer
247. In addition to this, the court
should have instructed the jury that if
the publication of the article complained
of was attended with circumstances of
oppression, negligence or malice, they
should give exemplary damages, not
only to compensate the plaintiff, but to
punish the offender: Buc ley v. Knapp,
48 'Mo. 152 ; Clements v. .falony, 55 Id.

352; Snyder v. Fulton, 34 Md. 128;
&Snderson
v. Caldwell, 45 N. Y. 398.
1U. The court instructed the jury that
"A perty under reasonable apprehension of danger of life or great bodily
harm, has a right, in self-defence, to
take the life of the aggressor, but he
must have had no agency in bringing
about the danger upon which he relies
to justify the taking of life." It is submitted that the true rule had just been
stated by the court, but this proposition
stood as a distinct and independent one.
The principle is well settled that one
person cannot attack another, and then
rely upon the danger thus brought upon
himself by a resistance of that attack
to justify taking life: , ate v. Starr, 38
Mo. 270; State v. Linney, 52 Id. 40;
State v. Underwood, 57 Id. 40; State v.
Brown, 64 Id. 367. This principle,
however, presupposes that' the party
bringing oh the difficulty and finally
taking life, has done some unlawful act,
has had some criminal or unlawful
agency in bringing the danger upon
himself. But the Instruction given in
the principal case does not distinguish
between lawful and unlawful agency.
Wilson approached Swayze and spoke
to him shortly preceding the killing.
This was a lawful act. One theory was
that he did this solely for the purpose
of remonstrance against newspaper
abuse, while another theory was that he
intended to provoke Swayze to attack
him and furnish a reason for homicide.
In either case he had an "agency" in
bringing about the danger he was placed
in by Swayze's attack. The language
of the court was therefore too broad,
and had a tendency to mislead the jury.
III. The plea of justification was
wholly insufficient. The justification
must be as brdad as the charge, and
of the very charge: Town. Sian..and
Lib.,
212; Folk. Stark. Sian. and
Lib., 692 and note I ; Id., ? 694 and
note 2; 1d.,
701 and note 4. And
where the charge is general, the plea
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of justification must state the facts spe- a reasonable doubt, or with the cercifically to sustain the same, and where tainty required to sustain an indictit is a charge of crime, the plea must ment. This is a vexed and still unsetspecify the crime and show its commis- tled question in the law. The authority
sion with the same certainty -as in an of the text-writers, it is submitted, is
indictment. In other words, it is not -against the rule laid down in the charge:
sufficient to answer that the charge is 2 Greenl. Ev., 426 ; Townshend on
true, but the facts which show the same Slander, 404. In some cases, where
to be true must be stated: Town. Slan. the defence is on the ground of fraud or
.355 and 358: Folk. Stark. crime on the part of the plaintiff, as in
and Lib.,
Slau. and Lib., 483 and notes 16 and Scott v. Home Ins. Co., 1 Dillon 105,
where, in an action on a policy of in1$; Atoely,v.. P.owell, 29 Mo. 429;
Smith v. Tribune Co., 4 Bliss 477 ; She- surance, the defence was that plaintiff
pard v. Merrill, IS John. 475.
had set his own house on fire, it must
IV. The court instructed the jury be conceded that the weight of authority
that the plea of justification must be is in favor of the rule in civil, and not
established by defendant "to your en- that in criminal, cases. But these au.
tire satisfaction, by which I here and thorities do not apply to a case of libel
Vlsewhere mean that the evidence in the See, however, the authorities collected
case must produce an abiding convic- and the subject ably discussed in the
tion in your mind" of the truth of the note to Kane v. Bihernia Ins. Co., 17
charge, and declined to instruct that the Am. Law Reg. N. S. 302.
H. B. JoI~sox.
offence charged must be proven beyond
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One partner cannot convey firm assets in satisfaction of a private debt, to the
exclusion of firm creditors, without the assent of his co-partners.
He may do so, however, if the entire firm participate in the assignment. This,
of course, where there is no fraud.
The lien of a firm creditor on firm assets is not superior to that of an ordinary
creditor upon the property of an individual debtor.
The doctrine of the primary application of firm assets to firm debts, and individual property to individual debts, is only a principle of administration adopted
by the courts when called upon to wind up the firm business, and they find no valid
change or disposition of the assets has been previously made by the members ; but
the principle itself springs out of the obligation to do justice between the partners.

THE case is fully stated in the opinion.

The opinion of the court -was delivered by
CHALMERS, J.-Harvey & Washington were partners in a liquor
saloon, the former having contributed the capital and the latter his
services. Harvey having become indebted to Odeneal, transferred
to him, in part payment of the indebtedness, and with the knowledge
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and consent of Washington, the entire business and stock of the
partnership. Odeneal subsequently took in Currie as a partner,
and the business was continued under the style of S. D. Currie
& Co. The debt of Harvey to Odeneal, which formed the consideration of the transfer, was the individual debt of Harvey, for
which neither Washington nor the firm of Harvey & Washington,
as a firm, were in any way responsible; but Washington assented
to and acquiesced in the sale. After the sale, Schmidlapp &
Brothers, creditors of the firm of Harvey & Washington, sued
out a writ of attachment against them, and caused the same to
be levied on their former goods, in the possession of S. D. Currie
& Co., and upon the ground that the transfer of the firm goods,
in satisfaction of the individual debt of one of the partners, was
fraudulent and void as against firm creditors.
Is the principle assumed a sound one? Is it true that partnership assets cannot, by the act or consent of all the partners, be
assigned in liquidation of the ]rivate debt of one of the members,
so as thereby to defeat the claims of firm creditors ? The authorities
on the question are divided, and in Burns on Fraudulent Conveyances it is broadly stated that such conveyances are voluntary and
void as to firm creditors, but it is doubtful from the cases cited,
whether the author is alluding to transfers made by one partner
alone, without the assent of his co-partners, or whether he embraces
assignments participated in by the entire firm. If the former, the
proposition is indisputable. If the latter, we think the sounder
reasoning and the weight of authority are against him., We speak
of cases like the present, where -there is no pretence of actual fraud,
and where there is no showing that the firm was at the time insolvent, though, according to some of the cases, the insolvency of
the firm would not affect the result. The firm creditors at large,
of a partnership, have no lien on its assets, any more than ordinary
creditors have upon the property of an individual debtor.. The
power of disposition over their property inherent in every partnership is as unlimited as that of an individual, and this jus di8sponendi in the firm, all the members co-operating, can only be
controlled by the same considerations that impose a limit upon the
acts of an individual owner; namely, that it shall not be used fox
fraudulent purposes. So long as the firm exists, therefore, its
members must be at liberty to do as they choose with their own,
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and even in the act of dissolution they may impress upon its assets
such character as they please. The doctrine that firm assets must
first be applied to the payment of firm debts, and individual property to individual debts, is only a princijile of administration
adopted by the courts, when from any cause they are called upon
to wind up the firm business, and find that the members have made
no valid disposition of, or charges upon its assets. Thus, when
upon a dissolution of the firm by death, or limitation, or bankruptcy, or from any other cause, the courts are called upon to wind
up the concern, they adopt and enforce the principle stated; but
the principle itself springs alone out of the obligation to do justice
between the partners. The only way to accomplish this is to so
marshal the assets that property which was owned in common shall
be applied to the joint debts, and that which was separately owned,
shall be applied to the liabilities of the separate owner, so that
neither class of creditors shall be allowed to trespass upon the fund
belonging to the other until the claims of that other shall have
been satisfied. This right of the creditors is therefore really the
right of their debtors, and enures to them derivatively from the
debtors. Hence, it is said the lien or quasi lien.of the creditors
"is worked out through the partners," the meaning of which is
that the firm creditors may demand the primary application of the
firm assets to the payment of their debts because each one of the
partners would have a right to demand .this as against his co-partners. It must follow, therefore, that if at a time when the -firm
was still in existence, where no legal liens of any sort have
attached, where it was neither bankrupt nor contemplating bankruptcy, all the members have agreed to a particular disposition of
its assets, and that disposition is neither colorable nor fraudulent,
that is to say, is upon a bona fide consideration, and reserves no
benefit to the grantees, inasmuch as none of the partners can be
heard to complain of such disposition, so none of the creditors of
the firm or of the individual members composing it can question or
attack it.
Conceding, as all the authorities do, that the firm creditors have
no independent right to demand to be first paid, but derive that
right solely by, through, and under the right which the partners
have to insist that this shall be done, it is impossible to see how
the rule can be enforced where all the members of the firm have,
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before the dissolution and without any ground to suspect fraud,
giveu to the assets a different direction.
While some courts of- high repute have taken a different view, we
confess our inability to escape the logic of this proposition. The
courts of New York, New Hampshire, Illinois, and perhaps other
states, seem to have taken a different view of the question. In
consonance with our view are the following, among other authorities:
WTitten v. Smith, Freeman's Ch. R. 231 ; Freeman v. Stewart,

41 Miss. 139; Carterv. Beavan, 6 Jones' Law (N. C.) 44; Bice
v. Barnard, 20 Vt. 479; Nat. Bank v. Sprague, 20 N. J. Eq.
14 ; Allen v. Centre Valley Co., 21 Conn. 130 ; Sigler v. Knoz
Co. Board,8 Ohio St. 511; -Ex parte Biffin, 6 Vesey 119; Campbell v. Mullett, Swanst. Ch. 550.

Judgment affirmed.
Court of Appeal8 of New York.
SAMUEL BERTHOLF v. JAMES O'RIELLY.
The constitutionality of an act of the legislature is to be determined solely by
its repugnancy to constitutional restraints or prohibitions. No violation of natural
justice and equity is sufficient.
That a statute impairs the value of property, or interferes V'ith its lawful use by
imposing a liability for tho consequences .of a lawful act, does not make it unconstitutional. All property is held subject to the power of the state to regulate or
control its use to secure the general safety and welfare.
It is no objection to the validity of a statute that it gives a right of action or
imposes a liability unknown to the common law.
A statute making the owner of premises on which liquor is sold liable for all
damages resulting from the intoxication of the persons purchasing the liquor, and
this without reference to any negligence of the owner, or to the lawfulness or unlawfulness of his tenant's action, held, valid as a police regulation of the traffic in
intoxicating liquors.

THIS was an action inder a statute of April 29th 1878, commonly called the Civil Damage Act, and was brought by the plaintiff against the defendant as the landlord of hotel premises, let
with knowledge that intoxicating liquors were to be sold thereon
by the lessee, to recover the value of a horse owned by the plaintiff, which died in consequence of having beeni overdriven by the
plaintiff's son while in a state of intoxication, produced in part
by liquor sold him by the lessee at his bar .on the leased premises. The essential facts, as established by the verdict, were as
follows:
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The defendant, when the act in question was passed, was the
owner of a hotel building and premises. In June 1875, he leased
them to one Firnhaber, knowing that the lessee intended to occupy
the building for a hotel and boarding-house, and sell intoxicating
liquors therein. The lessee entered into possession and opened a
bar in the hotel, and with the defendant's knowledge commenced
selling liquors therefrom. On Sunday, July 18th 1875, the plaintiff's son, who was residing with his father, informed him that he
had some business with a person residing about four miles from
the father's residence, and thereupon, with the plaintiff's knowledge, took his horse and buggy and drove away.
He did not go to the place where he informed the plaintiff he
intended to go, but went to the village where Firnhaber's hotel
was located, and to the hotel, and there purchased and drank
whiskey several times at the bar, and then drove to a neighboring
village and drank again, and returned to Firnhaber's, drinking
again on his return. He became, in consequence of these repeated potations, intoxicated, was arrested for disorderly conduct
in the streets, and after being detained in custody for a time was
discharged, and in the evening started for home, and the horse,
soon after it reached the plaintiff's house, died. The jury found
that it died from overdriving by the plainiff's son, and that his
treatment of the horse was caused by his intoxication.
It was
,= Firnhaber had no license to sell intoxicating liquors.
understood between him and the defendant, when the lease was
made, that a license was to be procured, and the defendant informed him that he would see that he had one. The plaintiff's
son was of intemperate habits, and at one time had been an inmate
of an inebriate asylum. The plaintiff recovered a verdict for the
value of the horse.
WU7liam J. Gros, for the plaintiff.
Lewis B. Carr, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ANIDREWS, J.-This and other cases which have been argued
imd are awaiting the decision of the court, present the question of
the constitutionality of the "act to suppress intemperance, pauperism and crime," passed April 29th 1873, commonly known as the
Civil Damage Act.
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It cannot be disputed that the facts found bring the case within
the terms of the statute, and authorize the recovery, if the law
itself is valid.
The act gives to every husband, wife, parent, guardian, employer
or other person "who shall be injured in person or property, or
means of support, by any intoxicated person, or in consequence of
the intoxication" of any person, a right of action against any person who shall, by selling or giving away intoxicating liquors, have
caused the intoxication, in whole or in part; and declares that
"any person or persons owning or renting, or permitting the occupation of any building or premises, and having knowledge that intoxicating liquors are to be sold thereon, shall be liable, severally
and jointly with the person or persons selling or giving intoxicating liquors aforesaid, for all damages sustained, and for exemplary
damages."
All the elements of the landlord's liability under the act exist
in this case, viz: The leasing of premises with knowledge that intoxicating liquors were to be sold thereon; the sale by the tenant
producing intoxication; and the act of the intoxicated person
,causing injury to the property of the plaintiff.
The question we are now to determine is, whether the legislature
has the power to create a cause of action for damages in favor of a
person injured in person or property by the act of an intoxicated
person, against the owner of real property, whose only connection
with the injury is that he leased the premises where the liquor
causing the intoxication was sold or given away, with knowledge
that intoxicating liquors were to b-e sold thereon.
To realize the force of this inquiry it is to be observed that the
leasing of premises for the sale of liquors thereon is a lawful act,
not prohibited by this or any other statute. The liability of the
landlord is not made to depend upon the nature of the act of the
tenant, but exists irrespective of the fact whether the sale or giving
away of the liquor was lawful or unlawful; that is, whether it was
authorized by the license law of the state, or was made in -violation
of that law. Nor does the liability depend upon any question of
negligence of the landlord in the selection of the tenant, or of the
tenant in selling liquor. Although the person to whom the liquor
is sold is at the time apparently a man of sober habits, and, so far
as the vendor knows, one whose appetite for'strong drink is habitually controlled by his reason and judgment, yet if it turns out
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that the liquor causes or contributes to the intoxication of the person to whom the sale or gift is made, under the influence of which
he commits an injury to person or property, the seller and his landlord are by the act made jointly and severally responsible. The
element of care or diligence on the part of the seller or landlord
does not enter into the question of liability. The statute imposes
upon the dealer and the landlord the risk of any injury which may
be caused by the traffic. It cannot be denied that the liability
sought to be imposed by the act is of a very sweeping character,
and may, in many cases, entail severe pecuniary liabilities, and its
language may include cases not within the real purpose of the enactment. The owner of a building who lets it to be occupied for
the sale of general merchandise, including wines and liquors, may,
under the act, be made liable for the acts of an intoxicated person,
where his only fault is that he leased the premises for a general
business, including the sale of intoxicating liquors, in the same way
as other merchandise. The liability is not restricted to the results
of intoxication from liquors sold or given away to be drunk on the
premises of the seller.
There is no way by which the owner of real property can escape
possible liability for the results of intoxication where he leases or
permits the occupation of his premises, with the knowledge that the
business of the sale of liquors is to be carried on on the piremises,
whether alone or in connection with other merchandise, or whether
they are to be sold to be drunk on the premises or to be carried
away and used elsewhere.
His only absolute protection against the liability imposed by the
act is to be found in not using or permitting the premises to be
used for the sale of intoxicating liquors.
The question whether the act under consideration is a valid
exercise of legislative power is to be determined solely by reference to constitutional restraints and prohibitions. The legislative
power has no other limitation. If an act can stand when brought
to the test of the constitution, the question of its validity is at an
end, and neither the executive nor judicial department of the
government can refuse to recognise or enforce it. The theory that
laws may be declared void when deemed to be opposed to natural
justice and equity, and although they do not violate any constitutional provision, has some support in the dicta of learned judges,
but has not been approved, so far as we know, by any authoritative
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adjudication, and is repudiated by numerous authorities. Indeed,
under the broad and liberal interpretation, now given to constitutional guaranties, there can be no violation of fundamental rights
by legislation which will not fall within the express or implied prohibition and restraints of the constitution; and it is unnecessary
to seek for principles outside of the constitution under which such
legislation may be condemned.
The main guaranty of private rights against unjust legislation
is found in that memorable clause in the Bill of Rights, that no person shall "1be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." Const., art. 1, sect. 6. This guaranty is not construed in any narrow or technical sense. The right to life may be
invaded without its destruction. One may be deprived of his liberty
in a constitutional sense without putting his person in confinement;
and property may be taken without manual interference therewith,
or its physical destruction.
The right to life includes the right of the individual to his body
in its completeness and without dismemberment ; the right to liberty,
the right to exercise his faculties, and to follow a lawful vocation
for the support of life; the right of property, the right to acquire,
possess and enjoy it in any way consistent with the equal rights of
others, and the just exactions and demands of the state.
The comprehensive scope of the guaranty of private property
finds many illustrations in the judicial decisions in our state. The
limit placed upon the power of taxation is an instance. The right
of taxation is an attribute of sovefeignty, without which governments would be powerless, and organized society could not exist,
and it is said to be unlimited. But this is only true when it is
exercised for a public purpose. The taking of private property for
a private purpose, under the guise of taxation, is no less a violation of the constitution than if the property of A. was attempted to
be transferred to B. by the mere force of a legislative mandate.
It is upon this principle that we have recently held in the case
of Weismer v. The Vli7lage of Douglass, 64 N. Y. 92, that a law
involving taxation in aid of a private enterprise and business was
unconstitutional and void.
In Jtrynehamer v. The People, 13 N. Y. 378, the sanctity of
private property, and the efficiency of constitutional guaranties for
its protection, under whatever guise it is attempted to be assailed
by legislation, was most ably and amply vindicated. The pro-
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visions in the act then under consideration were held to deprive
persons owning intoxicating liquors at the time of its passage, of
their property, although their title might not be affected by the
act, or the property itself, in its material substance, taken or destroyed. "There may," says MILLER, J., in Pumvelly v. The
Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 177, "be such serious interruption to
the common and necessary use of property as will be equivalent to
a taking, within the meaning of the constitution ;" and this observation is warranted by the general tenor of judicial authority.
Admitting, as we do, the soundness of this interpretation, and
fully approving it, wve come back to the proposition that no law
can be pronounced invalid, for the reason simply that it violates
our notions of justice, is oppressive and unfair in its operation, or
because, in the opinion of some or all of the citizens of the state,
it is not justified by public necessity, or designed to promote the
public welfare. We repeat, if it violates no constitutional provision, it is valid and must be obeyed. The remedy for unjust or
unwise legislation, not obnoxious to constitutional objections, is to
be found in a change by the people of their representatives, according to the methods provided by the constitution.
There are two general grounds upon which -the act in questlo&
is claimed to be unconstitutional: First. That it operates to restrain the lawful use of real property by the owner, inasmuch as
it attaches to the particular use a liability, -which suIstantially
amounts to a prohibition of such use, and, as to the seller, imposes
a pecuniary responsibility, which interferes with the traffic in intoxicating liquors, although the business is authorized by law.
And, second. That it creates a right of action unknown to the
common law, and subjects the property of one person to be taken
in satisfaction of 'injuries suffered by another, remotely resulting
from an act of the person charged, which act is neither negligent
nor wrongful on his part,*but which may be in all respects in conformity with law. The act, it is said, in effect authorizes the
taking of private property without "due process of law," contrary
to article one, section six, of the constitution, and is also a violation of the first section of the same article, which declares that
"no member of this state shall be disfranchised or deprived of any
of the rights or privileges secured to any of the citizens thereof,
unless by the law of the land or the judgment of his peers." If the
act is "due process of law," within the sixth section of the first

BERTHOLF v. O'RIELLY.

117

article, it is manifest that it is valid within the other section to
which reference is made.
The right of the state to regulate the traffic in intoxicating
liquors within its limits has been exercised from the foundation of
the government, and is not open to question. The state may prescribe the persons by whom and the conditions upon which the
traffic may be carried on. It may impose upon those who act under its license such liabilities and penalties as in its judgment are
proper to secure society against the dangers of the traffic, and individuals against injuries committed by intoxicated persons under
the influence of or resulting from their intoxication.
The licensee, by accepting a license, and acquiring thereby a
privilege from the state to engage in the traffic, a privilege confined
to those who are licensees, and withheld from all other citizens,
takes it subject to any conditions which the legislature may attach
to its exercise. He consents to be bound by the conditions when
he accepts the license; and the state is the sole judge of the reasonableness of the conditions imposed. And thc power of the
legislature, as a part of the excise system, to impose the liabilities
imposed by the act in question, upon licensed dealers, as a condition of granting the license, cannot, we think, be questioned.
A party cannot object, upon constitutional grounds, to a liability
which he has voluntarily assumed in consideration of a benefit conferred; and one may renounce even a constitutional provision made
for his own benefit. The extent to which the legislature has
heretofore gone in imposing restrictions or liabilities upon licensees
may be seen by reference to the Excise Law of 1857 (chap. 628),
many provisions of which are to be found in earlier legislation.
Section ten prohibits the sale of liquor on credit to any person
other than lodgers, and avoids all securities taken therefor. Section nineteen gives a penalty of fifty dollars to a wife against a
dealer in intoxicating liquors, who shall sell or give intoxicating
liquor to a husband after complaint made and notice given, as provided by the section, and a like penalty is given under similar circumstances for selling or giving away intoxicating liquors to a
wife or minor child. Section twenty-eight contains the germ of
the act now under consideration. It provides that any person who
shall sell strong or spirituous liquors to any of the individuals to
whom it is declared by the act unlawful to make such sales, "shall
be liable for all damages which may be sustained in consequence
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of such sale," to be recovered by the party sustaining the injury,
or by the overseer of the poor for his benefit.
The act of 1878 cannot, however, be sustained, in all its aspects
at least, upon the theory that the liability imposed by the act is a
condition of a privilege granted by the state. This cannot be
affirmed in respect to the liability of the landlord, whose right to
lease his property belongs to 'him as an incident of ownership.
The responsibility imposed is not confined to cases of unlawful
sales of liquor, or to sales made by licensed vendors. Any person
selling or giving away liquor, which causes intoxication and consequent injury, is made liable under the act.
The broad question is presented, whether the act transcends the
limits of legislative power in subjecting a landlord to liability,
under the circumstances mentioned in the act. Does the act, in
effect, deprive him of his property without "due process of law,"
in the sense of the constitution ? If the act can be sustained as
to the landlord, it is clearly valid as to all other persons; and its
validity as to the landlord is the question directly presented in this
case.
We need not enter into any elaborate discussion of the meaning
of the words "due process of law." This has 'been done in numerous judicial decisions. They are held, under the liberal interpretation given them, to protect the life, liberty and property of the
citizen against acts of mere arbitrary persons, in any department
of the government. DENIO, J., in Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N. Y.
212. These are the fundamental civil rights, for the security of
which society is organized; and all acts of legislation which contravene them are within the prohibition of the constitutional guaranty. In judicial proceedings, "due process of law". requires
notice, hearing and judgment; in legislative proceedings, conformity to the settled maxims of free governments, observance of constitutional restraints and requirements, and an omission to exercise
powers appertaining to the judicial or executive departments. It
is as difficult as it would be unwise, to attempt an exact definition
of their scope. Their application, in a particular case, must be
determined when the question arises, and, in the absence of exact
precedents courts must determine the question upon a consideration
uf the general scope of legislative power, the practice of governments, and in view of the conceded principle that individual rights
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may be curtailed and limited to secure the public welfare and the
equal rights of all.
"Due process of law," in each particular case, means, says
Judge CooLEY, "such an exertion of the powers of government as
the settled maxims of the law sanction, and under safeguards for
the protection of individual rights as those maxims prescribe for
the class of cases to which the one in question belongs."
The right of life, liberty or property is not absolute.or uncontrollable. The qualification in the Bill of Rights implies that the
deprivation of those rights may be due process of law; and governments could not be maintained, in the absence of power somewhere to regulate the relations of individuals to the state, and to
each other. Life, liberty or property may be forfeited for cause.
Private property may be taken for public use, on condition of compensation, or by taxation, or it may be transferred by judicial process, for the satisfaction of private contracts or as a compensation
for private wrongs and injuries.
The purpose of the act in question, as indicated by its title, is
the suppression of " intemperance, pauperism and crime." It cannot be denied that these are public purposes within the legitimate
scope of legislation, nor can it be doubted by any observing and
intelligent person that the use of intoxicating liquors is the fruitful
source of many of the evils which afflict society. Pauperism, vice
and crime are the usual concomitants of the unrestrained indulgence of the appetite for strong drink. Impoverishment of families, the imposition of public burdens, insecurity of life and property, are consequent upon the prevalence of the great evil of intemperance. If the legislature was impotent to deal with the traffic in intoxicating liquors, or powerless to restrain orregulate it in
the interest of the community at large, because legislation on the
subject might, to some extent, interfere with the use of property or
the prosecution of private business, the legislature would be shorn
of one of its most usual and important functions.. But, as we have
said, the right of the legislature to regulate the trafc is shown by
the uniform practice of the government. It may not, only regulate, but it may prohibit it. This was declared, after solemn argument and mature deliberation, in one of the propositions adopted
by this court in WTynehamer v. The People, subject only to qualification that the prohibition shall not interfere with vested rights
of property. The same principle was declared in the case of 2%e
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Metropolitan Board of Health v. Barrie, 34 N. Y. 657; and that
the legislative power extends to the entire prohibiticn of the traffic
has been recently adjudged by the Supreme Court of the United
States.
It is quite evident that the Act of 1873 seriously interferes with
the profitable use of real property by the owner. This is especially
true with respect to a building erected to be occupied as an inn or
hotel, and specially adapted to that use, where the rental value
may largely depend upon the right of the tenant to sell intoxicating
liquors. The owner of such a building may well hesitate to lease
his property, when by so doing he subjects himself to the onerous
liability imposed by the act. The act, in this way, indirectly
operates to restrain the absolute freedom of the owner in the use
of his property, and may justly be said to impair its value. But
this is not a taking of his property within the meaning of the constitution. He is not deprived either .of the title or the possession.
The use of his property for any other lawful purpose is unrestricted,
and he may let or use it as a place for the sale of liquors, subject
to the liability which the act imposes.
The objection we are now considering would apply with greater
force to a statute prohibiting, under any circuflstances, the traffic
in intoxicating liquors, and as such a statute must be conceded to
be within the legislative power, and would not interfere with any
vested rights of the owner of real property, protected by the constitution, although absolutely preventing the particular use, afortiori, the act in question does not operate as an unlawful restraint
upon the use of property.
That a statute impairs the value of property does not make it
unconstitutional. All property is held subject to the power of the
state to regulate or control its use, to secure the general safety and
the public welfare. "We think it a settled principle," says Chief
Justice SHAW, in Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 84, "growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil society, that every holder
of property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title,
holds it under the implied liability that his use shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the
enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community. All property is held subject tothose general regulations
which are necessary to the common good and general welfare."
Judge RD iELD, in a passage often cited with approval, speaking of
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the police power, says: "By this general police power of the state
persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and
burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state; of the perfect right of the legislature to do
which no question ever was or upon acknowledged general principles can be made :" Thorpe v. But. J- Burl. Railroad Co., 27 Yt.
140. The police power, so called, inheres in every sovereignty,
and is essential to the maintenance of public order and the preservation of mutual rights from the disturbing conflicts which, in the
absence of any controlling, regulating authority, and has been constantly exercised by the legislature in a great variety of cases. We
need not enumerate the subjects in relation to which this power has
been exercised. We shall content ourselves by referring to two
cases, recently decided by the Supreme Court of the United States,
to show how far courts have gone in upholding legislation atecting
private rights and property, as a due exercise of the police power
residing in the state. These cases are The Slaughter-House Cases,
16 Wall. 36, and _Munn v. The State of llnois, 4 Otto 114.
The first case involved the question of the validity of a statute of
Louisiana, passed in 1869, granting to a corporation, created by
the act, the exclusive right for twenty-five years to have and maintain slaughter-houses, landings for cattle, and yards for enclosing
cattle intended for sale or slaughter, within the parishes of Orleans,
Jefferson and St. Bernard, a territory containing over a thousand
square miles, including the city of New Orleans and a population:
of several hundred thousand persons, and prohibiting all other persons from building, keeping or having slaughter-houses, landings
or yards'for cattle intended for sale or slaughter, within these limits;
and requiring that all cattle and other animals, intended for sale or
slaughter within that district, should be brought to the yards and
slaughter-houses of the corporation; and, authorizing the corporation to exact certain fees for the use of its wharves, and for each
animal slaughtered. It appeared that when the act was passed
there were within this territory a thousand or more persons engaged
in the preparation and sale of animal food, many of whom owned
slaughter-houses and yards for the prosecution of their business.
The act was entitled "An act to protect the public health," &c.,
and the court lheld it valid* as a police. regulation. That the act
seriously interfered with the prosecution of a lawful business by a
large number of people and greatly impaired the value of slaughter.
VOL. XXVIL-16
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house property is evident. But the majority of the court were of
the opinion that the act was not void, either as creating a monopoly,
or as depriving the persons affected by it of their property, within
the meaning of the constitution.
In MIunn v. The State of Illinois, the court sustained an act
of the legislature of Illinois prescribing a maximum rate of charges
for the handling of grain, in warehouses in that state, and requiring warehouses to procure a license, and authorizing its revocation,
and prohibiting the carrying on the business of warehousing grain,
in any warehouse, without such license, or after its revocation.
The act was held to be valid as well as to warehouses built before
as to those which might be built after the act was passed. The
right of the state to make the regulations contained in the acts was
put upon the ground that the subject was one involving the public
interest and general welfare. WAiTE, Ch. J., in delivering the
opinion of the court, said: "When one devotes his property to a
use in which the public have an interest, he, in effect, grants to the
public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by
the public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he
has thus created."
The.e cases may perhaps be deemed to have carried the right
of legislative interference -with private rights and property to its
utmost limit, but they illustrate the scope of the police power in
legislation; and the reports abound in decisions which show that
the state has authority to regulate the use and enjoyment of property and the control of private business in many ways, "without
coming in conflict with any of those constitutional principles which
are established for the protection of private rights or private
property."
The right of the legislature to control the use and traffic in intoxicating liquors being established, its authority to impose liabilities upon those who exercise the traffic, or who sell or give away
intoxicating drinks, for consequential injuries to third persons, follow as a necessary incident; and the Act of 1873 is not invalid,
because it creates a right of action and imposes a liability not
known to the common law. There is no such limit to legislative
power. The legislature may alter or re: cal the common law. It
may create new offences, enlarge the scope of civil remedies, and
fasten responsibility for injuries upon persons against whom the
common law gives no remedy. We do not mean that the legisla-
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ture may impose upon one man liability for an injury suffered by
another with which he had no connection. But it may change the
rule of the common law, which looks only to the proximate cause
of the mischief, in attaching legal responsibility, and allow a recovery to be had against those whose acts contributed, although
remotely, to produce it. This is what the legislature has done in
the Act of 1873. That there is or may be a relation, in the nature of cause and effect, between the act of selling or giving away
intoxicating liquors, and the injuries for which a remedy is given,
is apparent; and upon this relation the legislature has proceeded
in enacting the law in question. It is an extension of the principle
expressed in the maxim, "tic utere tuo, ut alienum non icedas,"

to cases to which it had not before been applied; and the propriety
of such an application is a legislative and not a judicial question.
It is said that the statute imposes a liability for the consequences
of a lawful act. But the legislature, having control of the subject
of the traffic and use of intoxicating liquors, may make such regulations to prevent the public evils and private injuries resulting
from intoxication as in its judgment are calculated to accomplish
this end. It may prohibit the selling or giving away of liquor, or
it may, while not interfering with the liberty of sale or use, guard
against the dangers of an indiscriminate traffic, and induce caution on the part of those who engage in the business, by subjecting
them to liabilities for consequential injuries.
The Act of 1873 does not deprive the seller, who is made liable
under the act, of his property, without due process of law. It
authorizes it to be appropriated, in the due course of judicial proceedings, for the satisfaction of injuries resulting from intoxication
caused by his act. The legislatures have said that the seller may
be treated as the author of the injuries, and we think this was
within the legislative powers.
The liability imposed upon the landlord for the acts of the tenant is not a new principle in legislation. His liability only arises
when he has consented that the premises may be used as a place
for the sale of liquors. He selects the tenant, and he may, without
violating any constitutional provision, be made responsible for the
tenant's acts committed with the use of the leased property.
In Dobbins v. U. S., 6 Otto 395, a distillery had been seized and
condemned to be forfeited for the violation by the lessee of certain provisions of the Act of Congress regulating the business of distilling.

